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BAR BRIEFS
BOOKS FOR SALE
The Clerk of the United States District Court for the District
of North Dakota has for sale the "Federal Digest" complete with
all supplements including the 1940 supplement. These are being
offered for sale upon sealed bids, and any person interested may
secure the necessary form upon which to submit a bid for this
Digest System by applying to Beatrice A. McMichael, Clerk, Unit-
ed States District Court, Fargo, North Dakota. It will be neces-
sary that applications for bids be made immediately as all bids
submitted will be opened at the Office of the Clerk of the United
States District Court at Fargo, North Dakota, at nine o'clock
A. M. on the 26th day of April, 1942.
Beatrice A. McMichael, Clerk
United States District Court.
LIBEL AND SLANDER - ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
Defendant, as former employer of plaintiff, was required by
statute and by rules and regulations of the North Dakota Work-
men's Compensation Bureau to fill out in triplicate a furnished
form, stating the reasons for plaintiff's separation from his em-
ploy, copies of which were to be delivered to the plaintiff and the
Bureau, and the defendant to retain a copy. Plaintiff contends
that when defendant placed thereon an "X" opposite the words
"Misconduct connected with work," and added thereto the words
"Falsification of Audit Report," and submitted it to the Bureau,
it was a libel. Held, that this being a communication required by
statute, it was absolutely privileged. Stafney v. Standard Oil Co.,
et al., 299 N. W. 582 (N. D., 1941).
Then general rule has been that communications made in
pursuance of a duty, public or private, legal or moral, are only
qualifiedly privileged. 36 C. J. pp. 1241 and 1244; Townshend,
Slander and Libel (4th Ed., 1890), p. 300; Odgers, Libel and
Slander (5th Ed., 1881), p. 249; Newell, Libel and Slander (4th
Ed., 1924), p. 416; Robertson, Criminal Law, Sec. 592; Cooley,
Torts (3rd Ed., Vol. 1, 1932), Sec. 158. This rule dates at least
from 1855. Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & B1. 349, 119 Eng. Rep. at
512, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 173, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 846, 25 L. J. Q. B. 25,
3 W. R. 474, 85 E. C. L. 344.
It has also been the rule that courts have steadily refused to
enlarge the limits of the class of occasions which are absolutely
privileged. 36 C. J. p. 1240. These classifications are generally
stated as communications made in the course of judicial, legisla-
tive, or executive or administrative proceedings. 36 C. J. p. 1241.
By statute, North Dakota has substituted for executive or admin-
istrative proceedings, communications made " ... or in any other
proceeding authorized by law." See. 4354 (2), Comp. Laws 1913.
The court points out that the North Dakota statute omits the
word "o'fficial," which is usually found in this type of statute,
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in its reference to other proceedings, thus making the statute
broad enough to cover the occasion at bar. Furthermore, the
court says: "Among absolutely privileged communications are
those made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of
law, by or to heads of departments of the state," citing Tanner
v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878, 881, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
200 (1910). A Workmen's Compensation Board is an administra-
tive agency. Broadway etc. Realty Co. v. Metcalfe, 230 Ky. 800,
20 S. W. (2d) 988 at 990, 45 Wds. & Phr. (Perm.) 522 (1929).
The alleged libel can thus be classed as a communication to a
head of a state department.
The case history indicates that the rule of absolute privilege
was applied in 1895 to include the heads of executive departments
of the government. Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 61 S. Ct.
631, 40 L. Ed. 780 (1895). This was extended so as to reach and
include subordinate government officers when engaged in the
discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. De Arnaud v.
Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 163 (1904);
Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413, Ann. Cass, 1913C 821
(1912); U. S. v. Brunswick, 63 App. D. C. 65, 69 F. (2d) 383
(1934) ; Miles v. McGrath, D. C., 4 F. Supp. 603 (1933) ; Harwood
v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (1936). Under an application of
this rule, a report from the head of a veteran hospital to the Vet-
erans' Bureau, regarding the conduct of an employee, was held
absolutely privileged. Donner v. Francis, 255 Ill. App. 409
(1930). Likewise a letter from a State Superintendent of Public
Instruction to a county superintendent regarding the conduct and
qualifications of a teacher. DeBolt v. McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147
N. W. 462 (1914). These last two cases both involved a duty to
communicate. And a voluntary affidavit to the Naturalization
Bureau of the Federal Department of Labor, regarding the char-
acter of an applicant for citizenship, was also held absolutely
privileged. Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930).
But a further support of this case, as against the general
rule, is seen in the analogy to a witness in a judicial proceeding.
It is generally said that the statements of a witness are abso-
lutely privileged (subject, in America, to relevancy), because of
the public interest and policy. Newell, Libel and Slander (4th
Ed., 1924), p. 391. But it is submitted that it is more correct to
base the absolute privilege of a witness on his legal duty to speak,
to-wit: his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth. Basing the privilege on such legal duty, the question
of relevancy is also automatically provided for. (In England the
rule is broader, extending as absolute privilege even to irrelevant
remarks volunteered by a witness; but it is submitted that that
lact does not delete the cogency of this argument for the reason
that there has long existed a category of absolutely privil-
vant remarks, than does a duty to speak.) Thus since it appears
pears that there has long existed a category of bsolutely privil-
eged communications, consisting of those made under a legal duty,
into which the present communication readily falls, the court has
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not extended the classes of absolute privilege. But since this
statement is in derogation of the general rule, a further examina-
tion of such rule is required. It is submitted that a comprehen-
sive search exposes the fact that none of the cases cited by the
foregoing authorities in support of the rule that a communica-
tion under a legal duty is but qualifiedly privileged, actually in-
volved an explicit duty imposed by law such as in the case at hand.
And it is further submitted generally that any cases which pur-
port to lay down such rule, do so by way of dicta or under a dis-
tinguishable state of facts.
SCOTTY GLADSTONE
Third Year Law Student
University of North Dakota
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In the Matter of the Application of Clarence Kist for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Petr., vs. 0. K. Butts as Sheriff of Stutsman County, Respt.
That Section 3604 Compiled Laws 1913, provides alternative methods
of commencing actions for the violations of city ordinances; they may be
commenced either by the issuance and service of a summons or in a proper
case by the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
That the penalty clause of a city ordinance is not wholly void because
it authorizes a penalty in excess of that permitted by state statute and ajudgment and sentence pronounced under such an ordinance may be en-
forced to the extent that it is within the statutory limitation.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Jansonius, J. Opin-
ion of the Court by Burke, J. WRIT DENIED.
In Horace P. Fish and E. J. Olson, Respts., vs. H. H. France, et al as
Board of County Commissioners of Logan County, et al., Applts.
Proceedings under the provisions of chapter 225 of the Session
Laws of 1939 are not available to one seeking reduction in assessment and
taxation of real estate for years prior to the enactment of the statute.
Murray vs. Mutschelknaus, 70 N. D. 1, 291 N. W. 118 followed.
That a delinquent taxpayer may not set up as a defense to proceed-
ings to enforce the payment of taxes that the authorities have failed to
take steps to collect taxes from other delinquent taxpayers.
That the fact that a delinquent taxpayer has failed to take steps to
have alleged unjustly excessive taxes abated by the county commissioners
under the provisions of chapter 276 of the Session Laws of 1931 does not
bar an action to have tax deeds cancelled, as the remedy provided by said
chapter 276 is not exclusive.
That under the provisions of section 2193 of the Compiled Laws a
certificate of tax sale is prima facie evidence that all the requirements of
law with respect to the sale have been duly complied with; and unless the
defects relied upon are specified in the statute or are beyond the power
of the legislature to remedy, they may not be asserted after the certificate
has been issued. Anderson vs. Moynier, ante, followed.
That where a delinquent taxpayer commences an action, seeking to
have taxes cancelled, and tax certificates set aside, he should do equity
by tendering the amount of taxes justly chargeable against the real estate
involved.
